> ## Content Index
> Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.cryptowithblock.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further.

# Physical Safety: Don't Become a Target
- URL: https://www.cryptowithblock.com/physical-safety-don-t-become-a-target/
- Published: 2026-11-01T10:04:18.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-16T15:03:06.000Z
- Description: Wrench attacks target people, not code. Learn how attackers find crypto holders, how to hide your address, and how to make your funds slow to move.
- Author: Crypto With Block
- Tags: Protect Your Crypto, #lesson

## Don't become a target

Hi, I'm Block. So far in this series, every attack has come through a screen. A text, a link, a fake app. But some criminals skip the screen entirely. They show up in person. This lesson is about physical safety: what these attacks look like, how people get picked, and how to make sure you're not one of them.

## The wrench attack

Security people have a blunt name for this: a wrench attack. Instead of breaking your encryption, someone threatens you until you unlock things yourself. Strong passwords and hardware wallets don't help if a person can force you to use them. That's why this lesson matters as much as any other.

> Strong locks don't help if you are forced to open them.

And it's growing. One security firm that tracks these attacks verified seventy-two around the world in a single year, a record, and seventy-five percent more than the year before. And those are only the cases that became public. The firm says many are never reported.

> Only the reported ones.

Where they happen has shifted, too. In that same year, Europe accounted for more than forty percent of incidents. France alone had nineteen, more than twice as many as the United States. This isn't a problem in one country. It goes wherever the targets are easy to find.

> It goes where targets are easy to find.

French police describe the same trend in their own numbers: around thirty crypto-linked kidnappings in one year, and then more than forty in just the first few months of the next. Among the victims was a co-founder of a hardware wallet company. But most were not famous at all.

> Most victims weren't famous.

Here's the part that should change how you think. Families get targeted, not just holders. In one French case, a mother and her young son were taken ahead of a crypto ransom demand. In another, a gang apparently went after the wrong person entirely. You don't have to be rich. You just have to look like you might be.

> You just have to look like you might be rich.

The amounts can be surprisingly small. A co-founder of a hardware wallet company has said she's seen kidnappings over as little as six thousand dollars' worth of crypto. So this isn't only a problem for whales. Anyone who looks like a crypto holder can end up on someone's list.

> Small holders end up on lists too.

And it isn't only Europe. In New York, prosecutors say a man was lured to the city and held in a townhouse for more than two weeks while his captors tried to force out the password to his bitcoin wallet. He got away when they went to fetch his laptop. These attacks are about one thing: access.

> They want access, not you.

## What a physical attacker needs

So how do attackers pick who to go after? Go back to the first lesson in this series: thieves ask whether you have crypto. Physical attackers add two more questions. Where do you live? And when are you there? Let's look at where those answers come from.

The second and third questions are what turn an online thief into someone at your door. And the answers are usually easier to find than you'd think. A delivery label in a photo. A house number in the background of a video. An old public record. Each one is a small clue, and attackers are patient collectors.

> Every small clue adds up.

Sometimes the answers leak from companies you trusted. Remember the hardware wallet company whose customer list leaked, with more than a quarter million home addresses? That list told criminals exactly who owned crypto, and exactly where they lived.

> Who owns crypto, and where they live.

It happened again at a major exchange. Criminals bribed customer support contractors to copy customer records: names, home addresses, phone numbers, photos of government IDs, and snapshots of account balances. Close to seventy thousand people were affected. No password was stolen, but a list of who holds how much, and where, is valuable to the wrong people.

> Who holds how much, and where.

Sometimes it's even closer to home. In France, a tax official was charged with using government tax databases to look up crypto investors' addresses and family details, and passing them to criminals. In at least one case, those searches came before a violent home invasion. Your information sits in places you'll never see.

> Your data sits in places you'll never see.

## What you control

You can't control every database. But you can control what you add to the pile. The biggest thing most people give away is themselves: their posts, their photos, and the way they talk about crypto in public. Leaks you can't stop. Oversharing you can.

> Leaks you can't stop. Oversharing you can.

Think about what an attacker can piece together from a public profile. A screenshot of a big gain. A crypto username. A photo of the front of your house, your street sign, or your car. A gym check-in every morning at six. None of it seems dangerous alone. Together, it's a map to your door.

> Together, it's a map to your door.

And it's not only online. Talking about your holdings at work, at the gym, or at a party spreads further than you think, because people repeat good stories. Security experts give the same advice again and again: don't openly discuss what you hold. If someone asks, you dabbled a little, years ago.

> If asked, you dabbled a little.

Be careful at crypto events, too. Meetups and conferences are full of people who hold crypto, which makes them a natural hunting ground. Take your name badge off when you leave the venue, skip the branded jacket on the way home, and don't share your hotel or your plans with people you just met. Leave the event, and leave the label behind.

> Leave the event, leave the label.

What if your details were already in one of these leaks? Then assume someone knows your name, your address, and that you hold crypto. The exchange breach data was used to impersonate support staff and pressure customers. Treat any unexpected call, letter or visitor about your crypto as hostile, and move your deliveries to a PO box now.

> Unexpected contact about your crypto is hostile.

## Be hard to find

So let's make you hard to find. The goal is simple: even if someone suspects you hold crypto, they shouldn't be able to connect that to where you live or when you're home. Break the link between your money and your address.

> Break the link between your money and your address.

Start with your deliveries. Have hardware wallets and anything crypto-related shipped to a PO box or a pickup point, not your home. Opt out of people-search websites that sell your address, like we covered in the first lesson. And keep using the separate money email from a few lessons ago, so leaked accounts don't point to your real name.

> Nothing crypto should be shipped home.

Then audit your social media. Go through your public photos and remove anything that shows your house, your street, or your car's plate. Turn off location tags. Delete old posts about gains. And post trips after you're home, not while you're away.

> Post trips after you're home.

## Limit what can be taken

Now the second half of the plan. If someone does show up, what can they actually take? Attackers want speed. They want you to unlock everything in a few minutes and move it somewhere they control. So the goal is to make sure that simply can't happen.

> Make fast impossible.

Start with your phone. If your phone can move your entire savings in five minutes, then so can anyone holding you and your phone. Keep only a small spending amount on the phone. Keep savings somewhere that takes more time and more than one thing to reach. Your phone is a wallet, not a vault.

> Your phone is a wallet, not a vault.

The security firm that tracks these attacks recommends a few simple ideas. Store your recovery phrase and your hardware wallet in different places, so one break-in doesn't get both. And some holders keep a separate decoy wallet with a believable amount in it. It's something you can hand over.

> One break-in shouldn't get both.

For larger holdings, slow things down on purpose. A multi-signature setup needs two or more keys, kept in different places or with different people, before anything moves. Time locks can delay big withdrawals. When nothing can move quickly, there's far less reason to come after you.

> Slow money is a poor target.

On an exchange, turn on the withdrawal allowlist from the last lesson, so crypto can only go to addresses you saved earlier. It's another speed bump between someone with your phone and your money.

> Every speed bump helps.

## Your life comes first

And the most important rule of all. If you are ever confronted in person, your life is worth more than any amount of crypto. Don't resist, don't play hero. Get through it, get safe, and then go to the police. Everything in this lesson is about never getting to that moment. If you do, comply.

> No amount of crypto is worth your life.

Finally, bring your family into the plan, because they can be targets too. Ask them not to mention your crypto to anyone. Agree on what to do with unexpected visitors who need someone to open the door. And keep doors locked, with outside lights and a doorbell camera if you can. Quiet households are hard to target.

> Quiet households are hard to target.

## Physical safety

Here's the whole lesson in four lines. Don't announce it, online or in person. Keep your address off anything crypto-related. Keep only a little on your phone, and make the rest slow to move. And if it ever happens, your safety comes first. The best physical defense is never being found.

> The best defense is never being found.

## Sources

- [CertiK: 72 verified crypto wrench attacks in 2025, a record and up 75% from 2024; confirmed losses over $40.9 million; Europe over 40% of incidents; France 19 attacks vs 8 in the U.S.; kidnapping the most common method; recommended defenses include decoy wallets, storing seed phrases and hardware wallets separately, limiting public exposure, multisig and time-locked withdrawals](https://decrypt.co/356604/41m-in-losses-as-crypto-wrench-attacks-hit-record-high-in-2025?ref=cryptowithblock.com)
- [CertiK says losses may be understated due to under-reporting; experts advise not discussing holdings openly; SatoshiLabs co-founder: kidnappings seen for as little as $6,000 worth of crypto](https://cointelegraph.com/news/wrench-attacks-increased-losses-certik?ref=cryptowithblock.com)
- [France: around 30 crypto-linked kidnappings in 2025 (interior ministry unit) and more than 40 between January and mid-April 2026; Ledger co-founder kidnapped January 2025; a woman and her son kidnapped ahead of a crypto ransom demand; one gang apparently mistook their target](https://www.enca.com/news/france-reports-over-40-cryptocurrency-kidnappings-so-far-year?ref=cryptowithblock.com)
- [New York, May 2025: a man was held in a Manhattan townhouse for more than two weeks while suspects tried to force him to give up his bitcoin wallet password; he escaped](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bitcoin-torture-case-what-we-know?ref=cryptowithblock.com)
- [Coinbase 2025 insider breach: bribed support contractors copied names, addresses, phone numbers, emails, partial SSNs, government ID images and balance snapshots; 69,461 people affected per Maine AG filing; data used to impersonate support](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2025/05/15/coinbase-suffers-data-breach-gets-extorted/?ref=cryptowithblock.com)
- [A French tax official was indicted for using tax databases to look up crypto investors' addresses and family details and passing them to criminals; in at least one case the searches preceded a violent home invasion](https://decrypt.co/354078/masked-gunmen-tie-up-woman-france-steal-usb-crypto?rand=52368&ref=cryptowithblock.com)
- [Ledger customer data leak: about 272,000 customers' names, phone numbers and postal addresses published (December 2020)](https://decrypt.co/53961/bitcoin-wallet-ledger-discovers-full-extent-hack?ref=cryptowithblock.com)
- [Exchange withdrawal allowlist: when enabled, crypto can only be withdrawn to addresses saved in the address book](https://help.coinbase.com/en/international-exchange/manage-account/address-book-and-crypto-withdrawal-address-allowlisting?ref=cryptowithblock.com)

*Education only. Not financial advice.*