The Security Mindset: Think Like an Attacker
Learn how crypto thieves pick targets, the three questions they ask about you, and the habits that make the answer no every time.
Think like an attacker
Hi, I'm Block. Picture a thief with a list of a million phone numbers and one afternoon to make money. Today you're going to learn to think like the people trying to steal your crypto. How they pick targets, the three questions they ask about you, and how to make sure the answer is always no.
The attacker's mindset
I've worked in security for a long time, and the most useful thing I ever learned wasn't a tool or a setting. It was a way of thinking. Security people call it the attacker's mindset: before you protect something, you look at it the way a thief would.
Here's the first thing to understand. Crypto thieves aren't movie hackers. They're businesses. They buy lists of leaked names and phone numbers, send the same message to a million people, and only need a handful to answer.
They follow scripts, they track what works, and they want the most money for the least effort. So they don't try to break the blockchain. That's hard. They try to break you, because you're the shortcut.
They don't break the code. They break people.
Here's the scale of it. In a single year, Americans reported more than eleven billion dollars lost to crypto fraud, according to the FBI.
And look at where it went. The biggest share wasn't hacking. It was investment scams, where people were talked into sending the money themselves. People over sixty lost billions. And recovery scams, where victims get scammed a second time, added more than a billion on top. So the most important security system you own isn't your wallet. It's how you make decisions.
Your most important security system is how you decide.
The attacker's three questions
So let's sit in the attacker's chair. When they look at a list of a million people, they ask three questions. Does this person have crypto? How hard is it to get into their accounts? And can I rush them? Let's take them one at a time.
Question one: do you have crypto? You'd be surprised how often people answer that for them. A post celebrating a gain. A photo with a hardware wallet in the background. A public reply to a crypto company asking for help. Every one of those puts your name on a list.
And sometimes the list is made for you. A few years ago, a hardware wallet company had a customer database leak. More than a quarter of a million customers had their names, phone numbers and home addresses posted online. Those customers then got fake emails, scam calls, and even threats at their door. They did nothing wrong. Their data just ended up on a list.
Use a PO box or pickup point for crypto orders.
There's one more list most people never think about. People-search websites collect your name, address, phone number and relatives from public records, and sell them to anyone. Attackers use them to make their calls and texts sound real. You can ask those sites to remove you, or pay a removal service to do it for you.
Opt out of people-search sites.
So the fix for question one is boring, and it works. Stop announcing it. Keep accounts private, keep balances off social media, and get help only through the official app.
Quiet is a security setting.
Here's what getting on that list looks like. Someone posts that their wallet isn't working. Within minutes, a reply shows up from an account that looks official. It's friendly, it's fast, and it has a link. Follow it, and the page asks for one thing: your recovery phrase. They didn't hack anything. They just listened, and replied first.
And this is the page that link opens. It looks real. It might even copy a real company's logo. But the moment a site asks for your recovery phrase, you know everything you need to know.
So how do you check a link before it costs you? Don't click links in messages or replies at all. Type the address yourself, or use a bookmark you saved earlier. And be careful with search ads, because scammers buy ads that sit above the real site. If you didn't type it or bookmark it, don't trust it.
Didn't type it or bookmark it? Don't trust it.
Question 2: how easy are you to get into?
Question two: how hard is it to get into your accounts? Attackers love three weak spots. Your phone number, your email, and passwords you've used before. Let's start with the phone, because it surprises people the most.
It's called a SIM swap. The attacker calls your phone carrier pretending to be you. They convince the carrier to move your number onto a SIM card they control. Now every text meant for you goes to them, including your login codes. They reset your email, then use your email to reset your exchange.
Why does this work? Because phone carriers are built to help customers who lost their phone. An attacker with your name, your address and a believable story can sound exactly like you. Carriers have added more checks, but a convincing caller can still get through.
Your phone number is only as strong as a phone call.
This happens to big names too. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission had its own account on X taken over, and the agency said the attackers got in through a SIM swap on the phone number tied to that account. If it can happen to a government agency, it can happen to anyone using text-message codes.
Text-message codes are the weakest lock.
The second door is your email. Think about what happens when you click forgot password on almost any site. The reset link goes to your email. So whoever controls your email can reset nearly everything else, including your exchange.
Protect your email like it holds your money. It does.
So lock your email down first. Turn on an authenticator app or a security key for it. Remove old phone numbers from its recovery settings. Check for forwarding rules you didn't set up, because attackers add them quietly to copy your mail. And look at which devices are signed in. Ten minutes here protects every account you own.
Ten minutes on email protects everything.
The third door is reused passwords. When any website gets breached, its passwords end up on lists. Attackers feed those lists into tools that try the same email and password on hundreds of other sites automatically. If you reused it anywhere, they're in.
One password per site. No exceptions.
So here's how you close those doors. Use an authenticator app or a security key instead of text messages. Give your crypto its own email address that nobody knows. Use a password manager so no password is ever used twice. And ask your carrier to add a port-out PIN, which we'll cover step by step in the next lesson.
Phone, email, passwords: close the three doors.
Question 3: can they rush you?
Question three: can they rush you? This is the one that catches smart people. Scams are built around a clock. Watch how this one works.
A scary message. A phone number to call. And then the ask: read us the code. That code is the key to your account. The moment someone asks you to read them a code, it's a scam. Every time.
Asked to read out a code? Hang up.
Not every rush is loud. Some scams start with a friendly wrong-number text, and the clock comes weeks later, after trust is built. The new friend mentions a trading app that's been great for them. Then it's: the window closes tonight, add more now.
Here's the pattern to remember. The friendly stranger never asks for much at first. They show you small wins, let you withdraw a little, and wait until you trust the app. Then the withdrawals stop, and suddenly there are fees and taxes to pay first. If you have to pay to withdraw, the money is already gone.
Pay to withdraw? The money is already gone.
And if someone has already lost money, the next message is often from a recovery service that promises to get it back, for a fee. That's a second scam aimed at the same victim. Real investigators don't cold-contact you, and nobody legitimate charges upfront to recover crypto.
Anyone who charges to recover your crypto is a second scam.
Real companies and scammers behave differently, and once you see it, you can't miss it. Here's the rule I use myself: the more urgent it feels, the slower you go.
The more urgent it feels, the slower you go.
See yourself like an attacker does
Now do what security teams do, and look at yourself from the outside. Search your own name and email. Check whether your email shows up in known data breaches. Look at what your public profiles say about you. You're not aiming for perfect. You're looking for the easy wins an attacker would see first.
And make it a habit, not a one-time thing. Every few months, run the same check. New breaches happen, profiles change, and old accounts you forgot about can become the easiest door. Fifteen minutes, a few times a year, is one of the best trades you'll ever make.
Fifteen minutes, a few times a year.
The security mindset
Here's the whole lesson in four lines. Don't announce it. Close the three doors. Slow down when anything feels urgent. And check everything in the official app you opened yourself, never through a link someone sent you. You don't have to be impossible to rob. You just have to be harder than the next person.
You don't need to be impossible to rob. Just harder than the next person.
Sources
- Americans reported more than $11 billion in crypto fraud losses in one year; investment scams were the largest share
- FBI IC3 annual report (primary)
- Have I Been Pwned breach lookup
- Ledger customer data leak: about 272,000 customers names, phone numbers and postal addresses published (December 2020)
- SEC: its X account was compromised through a SIM swap of the associated phone number (January 2024)
Education only. Not financial advice.
Education only. Not financial, investment, tax or legal advice. Block, our on-screen presenter, is AI-generated, voice included; the research and scripts are ours.